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The recent failure of the sixth conference of the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) at Belgrade came as no surprise to
most observers. It is common knowledge that UNCTAD has failed to do
what it was set up to do—to narrow the ever-widening gap between rich and
poor countries. There has, however, been remarkably little examination of
the real reasons underlying its failure, least of all by the Brandt Commission.
Yet an understanding of just why UNCTAD has failed throws considerable
light on the general decline of the North-South debate. In particular, it casts
considerable doubt upon the validity of trying to rectify the maldistribution
of wealth between rich and poor countries without examining the mal-
distribution of wealth between rich and poor people. Is the lack of any real
probe into UNCTAD just an accidental omission, or is there a reluctance
to face the unpalatable facts that underlie the organization's failure?
Most people who have had contact with UNCTAD write it off as a bizarre
institution that deals in generalities. Its bizarre nature became all too apparent
at its previous conference (UNCTAD V, in 1979), when five thousand people
assembled in Manila under the most lavish conditions imaginable—for a
discussion on world poverty. The contradiction was accentuated by the neb-
ulosity of the policy speeches, and by the manner in which the speakers all
congratulated one another and applauded each others' platitudes. By the end
of UNCTAD V, the deficiencies of the organization were obvious—yet when
delegates met to review the situation they made no real proposals for change.
Government representatives renewed the contract of the Secretary General,
These views stem largely from sixteen years' involvement with UNCTAD, initially as a
delegate for Australia, subsequently on field assignments in developing countries, and for the
past eight years in Geneva in charge of the section that handles political shipping issues. The
activities of the UNCTAD Committee on Shipping-provide a penetrating insight into the North-
South dialogue because shipping is one of the few areas in which UNCTAD has moved from
generalities to specifics. Consequently, shipping provides one of the best indicators of resistance
to change.
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388 International Organization
which was tantamount to expressing their satisfaction with the way the or-
ganization was functioning, or failing to function.
At Belgrade, the policy speeches were just as nebulous, but the applause
and congratulatory statements died down after the first day or two: people
simply abandoned the pretense of a great success. All the same, it would be
surprising if delegates were to make any real proposals for change following
Belgrade.
The failure of UNCTAD is often attributed to the "group system" (whereby
the arguments advanced are those of groups of countries and not those of
individual countries) and to the inefficiency of the UNCTAD secretariat.
Both these factors do call for comment, but what really needs examining is
not so much the failure of UNCTAD as the failure of governments—of rich
and poor countries alike—to show any real concern. It is this latter failure
which illuminates not only the relationship between North and South but
also the relationship between rich and poor people.
The group system
The member states of UNCTAD are grouped into three "political parties."
Group B is comprised of the industrialized countries, members of the OECD;
the Group of 77 is comprised of the developing countries (being a fusion of
Groups A and C, which covered developing countries in different regions);
and Group D's members are the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. There
are also a couple of "independent members," China and Israel. Within the
groups, there are enormous differences. Even in Group B, levels of prosperity
and economic systems differ to a marked degree; the common factor is that
all members are relatively prosperous market-economy countries. The Group
of 77 embraces a much more diverse collection of countries, ranging from
the oil-producing countries, through rapidly industrializing countries like
India and Brazil, to small impoverished countries like Nepal and Niger. The
one thing these countries have in common is that they all classify themselves
as "developing."
Unlike most national political parties, these international parties lack any
coherent political philosophy. Logically, the Group of 77 might be expected
to produce a body of proposals, but interests within the group are so divergent
that the member countries can usually reach a uniform position only by
phrasing their proposals in terms so general that they could not be used as
a basis for serious negotiations. In fact, it is no secret that many of the 77
speakers who made "demands" at UNCTAD VI were aiming to produce
press reports for domestic consumption rather than to provoke international
discussion. Besides, the Group of 77 has one serious disadvantage when it
comes to policy making: it has no secretariat.
The Group B countries generally confine their role to opposing any proposal
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UNCTAD's failures 389
for change. Although most of them realize that a more equitable distribution
of wealth would be in the long-term interests of a healthy world economy,
in the short term any change would adversely affect some of the B countries.
The ones likely to be affected call for, and obtain, the support of the others
in the name of "Group solidarity" (it being understood that on some future
occasion reciprocal support will be obtained). Even when the Group B coun-
tries put forward "positive proposals" of their own, these are usually of a
cosmetic nature designed to conceal their underlying resistance to change.
The Group D countries play very little part in the North-South debate.
The problems, they claim, are attributable to the former colonial activities
of the Group B powers (and to the current activities of the Group B cor-
porations). They are consequently a matter for settlement between B and
the 77. Nevertheless, the D countries generally support the 77, as does China.
Thus, if any specific proposals are to come forth, they could only come
from the international civil servants who comprise the UNCTAD secretariat.
But whereas national civil servants work to the instructions of the politicians
in power, on the international scene there is no party in power and there is
no cabinet to direct policy; the UNCTAD secretariat works on its own —
often with peculiar results, and frequently with no results at all.
UNCTAD could have become a better forum for debating North-South
issues had it been equipped with a competent secretariat to produce sound
policy proposals. Unfortunately, most of the secretariat's reports have been
notable for little but their length, verbosity, and obscurity, often being issued
too late to be even read, let alone considered, before the relevant meetings.
Insofar as it has ennuciated any general philosophy, the secretariat has
talked about the need to "change the structure of the world economy" and
proposed "development strategies" to bring about a "New International
Economic Order" (but all in the vaguest terms). Few of the secretariat's
proposals have served as a basis for taking specific action. As an inevitable
consequence, most UNCTAD discussions have degenerated into an exchange
of generalities. Even when the secretariat has proposed specific action, its
proposals have read far too much like election speeches. Promising too many
things to too many people, proposals emphasize advantages and ignore dis-
advantages instead of arguing the pros and cons of different courses of action,
which is so essential for sound policy formulation.
Although UNCTAD officials talk of their various successes over the years
in the form of international conventions, agreements, and resolutions, most
of these contain more than a fair quota of vague language, and much of the
consensus relates to minor rather than major matters. The "successes" have
a certain value in demonstrating the procedures that could be used if ever
governments were to get down to serious business, but considerably less
value from the point of view of substance.
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390 International Organization
Problems in the secretariat
Among government delegates, it is common to attribute UNCTAD's failure
to the failure of the secretariat, but, as already noted, the real question relates
to the lack of any move by governments to change the secretariat.
When the secretariat was set up, what was needed was a small, cohesive
body of senior officials who could clarify the issues in different sectors of
the world economy and point out what could, and what could not, be achieved
by intergovernmental action. It was essential that the top officials be knowl-
edgeable not only as regards specific sectors of the economy but also as
regards the way in which governments function. They had to be people, that
is, with some appreciation of the difference between an academic thesis and
a policy proposal upon which governments can take action, and also people
with some basic administrative ability.
As it turned out, the qualities most needed were the most lacking. The
high salaries and diplomatic status inevitably attracted individuals who were
more interested in the salary and status than in the job itself. Many officials
treated their Geneva appointments as little more than a comfortable way of
spending their last years before retirement.
As a result, the secretariat has been not so much administered as allowed
to drift. People have been hired with no real qualifications to serve the
organization; others have been engaged to undertake assignments that could
not possibly serve the organization's aims; others have arrived at the Palais
des Nations to find themselves pitifully underemployed. Staff are permitted
to develop all sorts of proposals for "further studies," proposals that are
designed to serve not so much the interests of the developing countries as
the personal needs of the staff in justifying extensions of their employment
contracts. Vast sums of money are wasted on unnecessary work (and on
paying people who do not really work at all), and on the inevitable worldwide
air travel to which so many UN officials become addicted. But at the same
time, there is considerable penny-pinching in areas where expenditure is
really needed: professional staff have to work without even the most ele-
mentary reference facilities.
The result is the well-known stream of poor-quality documentation that
flows into the in-trays of government delegates. Many of these reports should
have been suppressed without being submitted, but senior officials tend to
insist on publishing everything that can be published—as if the sheer volume
of paper were an indicator of productivity. Yet the obscurity that permeates
so many reports may not be entirely accidental: many officers feel, at least
subconsciously, that if they are obscure, no one will ever be quite sure just
what they are saying, and hence no one will ever say that their findings are
wrong. The same attitude applies to the length of documents and the delays:
if delegates receive long documents at the last minute, there is a fair chance
that they will never read them—and hence not criticize their authors. Even
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UNCTAD's failures 391
more serious, though, is the tendency of the top officials to tamper with the
few good reports that are produced. Being political survivalists at heart, they
erase points that might cause difficulties for particular countries (and hence
the "election speech" character of so many UNCTAD reports).
As in other UN bodies, there is virtually no internal evaluation. The work
of staff members is periodically evaluated on several counts and must be
rated according to the standard UN ratings of Outstanding, Very good, Ad-
equate, Somewhat below standard, and Poor. However, supervisors have
been instructed that "Adequate" is deprecatory and would give a staff member
the right of appeal, so even officials who can recognize poor work when they
see it end up by rating all staff work as "Outstanding" or "Very good."
Faced with a growing reputation for inefficiency, many of the top officials
do what incompetent civil servants do all over the world: they turn to matters
of organization and procedure. But, as always, no amount of reorganization
can compensate for a basic lack of competence. At the same time, many
officials turn away from the policy issues for which the organization was
established and bury themselves in technical assistance projects. Most of
these projects are of dubious value to the recipient developing countries but
of decided financial value to the bureaucrats and to the vast army of "experts"
who have made technical assistance their profession.
The growing inefficiency of the secretariat has been accompanied by a
decline in the number and the caliber of delegates attending UNCTAD
meetings. Governments see little point in sending large numbers of high-
caliber people to discuss the sort of generalities tabled for consideration.
There has been a marked tendency to leave attendance to Geneva-based
staff, who are inevitably jacks-of-all-trades who cannot discuss specific subjects
in depth. Delegates from the capitals are much more numerous in summer
than in winter, which suggests that some may not be traveling to Geneva
to attend the UNCTAD meetings so much as using UNCTAD as an excuse
to take trips to Europe. In turn, the decline in delegate quality has had an
adverse effect upon the secretariat, as officials see little point in producing
in-depth proposals for discussion by generalists. A vicious circle of cause
and effect has set in, leading to the organization's ever-increasing
ineffectiveness.
Inaction in the member governments
However, all of these facts have been well known to government delegates
for some time—and, it must be presumed, to government officials in the
capitals. The laxity of work in Geneva's Palais des Nations has even been
described in vivid terms in the press. Why, then, are there no signs of
concern?
From time to time, delegates from countries that supply most of the funds
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392 International Organization
(such as the United States) complain of the expense and wastage—but always
in such a way as to suggest that they want to have a complaint on record
rather than any real investigation and change. When delegates met to review
the debacle of UNCTAD V, they made a number of proposals: for example,
that the secretariat's future reports should be short (32 pages), action-oriented,
and issued "on time." But these demands had been made so many times
before, and ignored so many times, that the likelihood of any change was
minimal. Besides, the delegates' idea of getting documents "on time" is that
governments should receive them six weeks before a meeting, which is totally
insufficient for the formulation of a national viewpoint on any issue of sig-
nificance. Did the delegates not expect (or did they not want) the secretariat
to come up with any propoals of significance?
All the evidence points to an overwhelming desire on the part of govern-
ments to prevent any change in the status quo, under which rich people get
steadily richer and poor people, at least comparatively, get steadily poorer.
The attitude of the Group B countries is both evident and comprehensible,
since these are the countries that would suffer from any change. What is
harder to understand, even allowing for the divergent interests that make it
difficult for the Group of 77 to arrive at a common policy, is the 77's restraint
in pressing for changes in the economic system that keeps their countries in
a state of poverty. Occasionally, delegates from the 77 deliver a forceful
opening statement, which suggests that they are about to move from gen-
eralities to specifics, but then fail to follow it up. Like the American delegates
who complain about wastage, the 77 often give the impression of wanting
to get a statement on record rather than to bring about any real change.
Thus, in many UNCTAD debates, one sees the Group B countries defending
the status quo, the 77 refraining from attacking it, and Group D sitting and
watching.
The Group B countries have an easy task in defending the status quo in
sectors where the proposals consist of generalities. All they have to do is to
respond with their own, equally vague, generalities and they can be sure that
nothing concrete will emerge. It is when specific proposals are advanced that
the true intensity of Group B's opposition to change becomes apparent.
For the most part the B government delegates respond to specific arguments
with evasive generalities. Professing to agree on the need for reaching an
international consensus, they fail to show any signs of being prepared to
accept a consensus on any terms but their own. The more reactionary state-
ments are generally made by business organizations (which have been known
to distort proposals to make them easier to attack). In private discussion,
the government delegates dissociate themselves from organizations that "only
speak for the private sector," yet in their public statements they never give
any indication that they are not in entire agreement.'
1. Some business organizations that can claim to be international (by virtue of the geographical
spread of their membership) have official consultative status with UNCTAD; otherwise, they
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UNCTAD's failures 393
Outside the conference rooms, the Group B countries go further. They
have been known to send envoys to complain to governments of developing
countries whose delegates they regard as troublemakers. Some have even
involved "difficult" governments in potentially profitable contract negotia-
tions, which effectively prevents them from speaking out at a meeting while
negotiations are in progress.
The main effect of the Group B tactics has been to drive militancy under-
ground. The governments of the 77 have become tired of the intransigence
and prevarication they meet in UNCTAD, and individual delegates have
become reluctant to be identified and harassed as troublemakers. Conse-
quently, developing countries that are big enough, or that have sufficient
bargaining power by virtue of their resources, avoid participating in any
depth in UNCTAD debates and quietly go ahead and take unilateral action.
The Latin American countries, for example, have maintained a low profile
in UNCTAD debates on cargo entitlements for national fleets while passing
their own cargo reservation laws. Countries in Africa and Asia are now doing
the same.
However, the failure of the 77 to attack the existing economic order more
vigorously can only be partly explained by the manner in which the 77
militancy has been driven underground. After all, comparatively few of the
members of the 77 have sufficient commercial strength to be able to act
unilaterally, and even the strongest of them can take only a limited amount
of unilateral action. For a true explanation, one must look deeper than the
superficial conflict between rich and poor countries and examine the under-
lying conflict between rich and poor people. For the status quo does not so
much benefit rich countries as rich people, whether they are in rich or poor
countries.
Rich people and the status quo
There is a strong community of interest between the rich people of the rich
countries and the rich people of the poor countries. The governments of
poor countries are virtually all controlled by rich people, who have more in
common with the rich people who control the Group B corporations than
they have with their own poverty-stricken fellow countrymen.
usually try to have representatives attached to their government delegations. The extent of the
influence of such business interests has been the subject of specific comment in UNCTAD (see
the secretariat report Open Registry Fleets, TD/B/C.4/220 [Geneva, 3 March 1981], especially
p. 15). Prior to UNCTAD V, the secretariat made a very limited proposal for cargo-sharing in
regular bulk traffic with developing countries. As the concept of cargo-sharing had already been
accepted in the liner trades (which are regular), it would have been difficult to oppose this
proposal on grounds of logic or equity. Nevertheless, an association of tanker owners circulated
counterarguments against a so-called "UNCTAD proposal to introduce cargo-sharing into all
bulk trades." As most bulk trades are irregular, the association had no difficulty in painting an
horrific picture of the practical difficulties that would arise. By exaggerating proposals, business
organizations can strengthen the arguments against any international action whatsoever.
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394 International Organization
In international warfare, there is universal contempt for quislings, those
who work with occupying forces to the detriment of their nation's interest.
In international business, however, it is quite common for economic quislings
to assist foreign corporations to exploit their own countries. Such people
exist in all countries, but it is in the poor countries that the results are so
tragic.
It is in the national interest of a poor country to pay as little as possible
for imports and services such as shipping, to obtain as much as possible for
exports, and to obtain the greatest possible involvement of its nationals in
ventures operated by transnational corporations on its own territory. However,
economic quislings will agree to pay more than necessary for imported goods
and services (or agree to unnecessary imports) and to accept less than necessary
for exports, and will allow a corporation to treat their country like an economic
colony—provided that they themselves are "looked after" by the corporation.
In fact, the main reason why the rich of the rich countries are so successful
in maintaining their grasp on the world's wealth and wealth-producing ac-
tivities is that there are so many rich and would-be-rich people in the poor
countries who are only too willing to collaborate with them. "Economic
colonialism" depends just as much upon economic quislings as upon economic
imperialists.
Once one perceives the underlying labyrinth of personal interests and
pressures, it becomes apparent that the formal debates between rich and
poor countries in UNCTAD are little more than mock battles between the
rich people of the rich countries and the rich people of the poor countries,
stage-managed by the rich people of the secretariat. All of the participants
have a vested interest in seeing that UNCTAD does nothing to change the
status quo.
Yet none of them would want to see the organization abolished. If
UNCTAD did not exist, it would be harder to resist pressures to set up
some other organization, one that might turn out to be effective. As things
stand, the leaders of the rich countries can pacify some of their left-wing
pressure groups by talking about their efforts in UNCTAD to help the poor
countries, and the rich leaders of the poor countries can talk about their
efforts in UNCTAD to obtain a greater share of the world's wealth for their
people. Though established to help poor countries, UNCTAD has ended up
by serving the interests of rich people.
It is impossible to solve the international problem of poverty without
tackling the issue of rich and poor people—and yet the question of personal
enrichment is one that simply cannot be raised, let alone answered, in inter-
national bodies. Any attempt to raise this issue meets objections on the
grounds that such questions constitute unjustifiable interference in the do-
mestic affairs of sovereign states. At UNCTAD V, the people who met in
such lavish conditions to discuss world poverty all behaved as if they believed
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UNCTAD's failures 395
the maldistribution of personal wealth to be totally irrelevant when considering
the maldistribution of international wealth.
In actual fact, nothing could be more relevant. The reason is obvious:
governments and corporations that oppose any redistribution of the world's
wealth are all controlled by people, people who are in a position to reward
those who do them favors and to exert pressure on those who do not. When
people fight to preserve the wealth of their country or their corporation, it
is because they expect to be rewarded for their efforts. The rewards sought
by the UNCTAD delegates who defend the status quo (or who refrain from
attacking it) are relatively modest: they are just bureaucrats who are seeking
promotion. But the delegates are only the tentacles of a vast hierarchy of
vested interests, headed by people whose rewards from the status quo are
very substantial, and who can offer substantial rewards to those who cooperate
with them and exert substantial pressure on those who. do not. Indeed, it is
impossible to understand the failure of the North-South debate merely by
examining the substantive issues; one must look at the underlying labyrinth
of personal interests and pressures.
So long as people are free to enrich themselves excessively, they will con-
tinue to apply excessive pressure to preserve a status quo that enables rich
people to get richer. The failure of the North-South debate can ultimately
be traced back to the failure to curb excessive personal enrichment. The
machinery for dealing with North-South issues will continue to fail so long
as it is geared to do no more than examine the superficial issues between
rich and poor countries.
The failure to curb excessive personal enrichment
However, while excessive personal enrichment cannot be curbed by inter-
national action, it is also the one issue upon which absolutely no initiative
can be expected from national policy makers. The reason is simply that
anyone who is sufficiently powerful to influence national policies is inevitably
well-to-do, if not rich—someone who has already collected a fair share of
the rewards and who is hoping for more. And there are very few politicians
or civil servants in the world who want to abolish their own perks and
privileges. Even leaders of trade unions and left-wing political parties become
rather attached to the joys of living at the top. Outside the circles in which
government policies are formulated, the effects of excessive personal en-
richment are largely unstudied. Scholars steer well clear of the subject, perhaps
out of fear of offending people who could help their future careers.
Certainly, there has been public comment on Third World elites who
enrich themselves while neglecting their communities, but always with the
innuendo that this is a problem endemic to developing countries. Yet it is
obvious to anyone who has moved around in the bureaucracies of business,
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396 International Organization
industry, and government that exactly the same thing is occurring in the
industrialized countries, albeit in a less blatant form.
High salaries, status symbols, and fringe benefits have ceased to be rewards
for competence and effort and have become ends in themselves. They divert
administrative and managerial talent away from the task of improving the
productive capacity of society and into incessant power struggles to get to
the top, creating a whole new breed of power-seekers who are more competent
at manipulating themselves into well-paid, prestigious positions than they
are at performing the functions involved. The worst aspect is that government
planning officers, whose sole function should be to determine what is best
for their country, have become notorious for favoring policies that will max-
imize their own roles and minimize those of their rivals. Whether the policies
happen to be good or bad for the country has become a secondary consid-
eration. The same applies a fortiori to the planners in international
organizations.
It is true that the money spent "rewarding" the top people would make
little difference to the standard of living if redistributed in cash throughout
the community. However, it would make a significant difference if invested
on the factory floor to increase productivity and improve working conditions.
Moreover, people who are free to use their decision-making powers to make
life comfortable for themselves soon cease to care how comfortable or un-
comfortable life may be for the rest of the community, and the money they
siphon off for lavish living arouses the hostility of the work force. A hostile
work force, in turn, discourages outside investment. Thus, the failure to curb
excessive personal enrichment, whether in rich or poor countries, ultimately
leads to poor national planning and administration, mismanagement, a hostile
work force, and insufficient investment—a perfect formula for failure.
Given the vested interests, though, if there is to be any revolt against
excessive personal enrichment it could only come from outside the established
corridors of power. Such a revolt, in fact, could only come from the sort of
popular pressures that stopped the war in Vietnam and forced governments
to take up issues of human rights.
The need for some such revolt is greatest in the poor countries, for they
suffer from the greatest gap between rich and poor people, the greatest eco-
nomic failures, the greatest instability, and the greatest lack of investment.
The inequitable distribution of wealth within poor countries also provides
rich countries with a sound reason for refusing aid, since they can argue that
benefits would only end up in the hands of the ruling elites. In fact, aid to
the Third World has been cynically defined by some disillusioned field experts
as "taxing money out of the pockets of the poor of the rich countries in
order to fill the pockets of the rich in the poor countries."
However, it is in the poor countries that such a revolt is least likely to
occur, because most of them lack the democratic structure needed for popular
protests, and most lack the middle classes of reasonably educated people
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UNCTAD's failures 397
from whom such protests are most likely to arise. In any event, it is the rich
of the rich countries who set the basic pattern for lavish living-at-the-top.
If excessive personal enrichment were to be forced out of fashion in the rich
countries, it would soon cease to be the fashion elsewhere.
The decline of the North-South debate
The North-South debate is fading toward oblivion because the conflict be-
tween rich and poor countries was never really the fundamental issue, and
the debate has now reached the point where the participants can no longer
pretend that they are making progress. Initially, the debate had a strong
appeal to those who felt motivated to do something about poverty, but after
years of talking the poverty continues.
The basic problem in tackling poverty is that one cannot examine the
question of poverty unless one also examines the question of wealth—though
that is just what national politicians try from time to time to do by advocating
a "war on poverty," whereby they can pander to public feelings of pity
without pointing accusing fingers at their rich constituents. One might con-
ceivably wage war on wealth, but to speak of waging war on poverty is
meaningless. It is for this reason that wars on poverty invariably fade from
public notice after the first flurry of political speeches.
Unlike wars on poverty, the North-South dialogue at least recognizes the
relevance of wealth when dealing with poverty—but it is the delightfully
vague wealth of the rich countries, or the even vaguer wealth of "the West."
Treating the issue in terms of rich and poor countries implies that the poor
countries (including their upper layers of very rich people) should enjoy a
monopoly on world pity, while the rich countries (including their masses of
poor people) should take all the blame. While it is common for countries to
be called rich or poor if the majority of their citizens are rich or poor, it is
the poverty of poor people, not poor countries, that should arouse sympathy,
and it is the avarice of rich people, not rich countries, that calls for examination.
There will be no solution to the international problem of "poor countries"
until governments take action to restrain excessive personal enrichment. And
governments are only likely to take action if popular pressure forces them
to do so.
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